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Abstract
An examination of introspective evidence of artists and
scientists on their creative processes suggests that determining
the nature of the causes underlying the transformation of
material in thought is the key problem for understanding
creativity. A similar problem underlies the transformational
process of understanding metaphor. Evidence for transformations
in thought under the impact of experiential anomalies is provided
by Kuhn's view of scientific revolutions and the nature of
thought in dreams. Such transformations are guided by or express
affective states or attitudes. Evidence for the productive role
of affect in thought is presented from several sources, including
research on the frontal regions of the brain and the affective
correlates of response to metaphor. It is suggested that an
adequate theory of creativity must await further research on the
anticipatory properties of affect, but that a useful place to
begin such research is with the response to metaphor.
Metaphor and Transformation: The Problem of Creative Thought
The processes of thought underlying creative behavior are
still poorly understood. The experimental tradition in cognitive
psychology, which has been so productive of insights into other
types of thought, still has almost nothing to offer here. The
thought transformations that take place in creativity pose a
major problem for psychological theory. I shall suggest that
essentially the same problem is faced by those seeking to explain
the thought processes involved in understanding metaphor. The
reason for this may lie in the exclusive attention given to
thought per se by cognitive psychologists, to the neglect of
affective matters (Zajonc, 1980). In this paper I shall suggest
that one way of enriching cognitive theory is by studying the
role of affect in thought, and that a promising place to start is
to look at the ways affect may facilitate the response to
metaphor. I look at evidence that affect may guide thought in
productive ways, and suggest that creative thought of the highest
order may be the result of such affective processes.
The conditions under which affect might play this role are
impossible to study directly. Creative thought of the most
productive kind cannot be made the object of laboratory
investigation: its occurrence is too unpredictable, and its
complexity is such that even were an Einstein or a Stravinsky to
be placed in the psychologist's laboratory the limitations on
what could be observed or measured militate against finding much
evidence of value. But thought transformations analogous to
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those in creativity can be found in one or two other domains
where, as it turns out, it is possible to point to the productive
role of affect in initiating and leading the development of
thought. One of the features of such domains is the encounter
with anomalies, as in scientific thinking, according to Thomas
Kuhn's (1970) original view of scientific theory-formation; but a
similar thought pattern is also discernible in dreams and in
comprehension of metaphor. The model of creative thought that
will be sketched, therefore, will consist of two key components:
the encounter with anomalies, and the productive role of affect.
It will be directed towards elucidating the transformational
processes in creative thought.
Psychological investigations of creativity have spanned a
wide range of factors in an attempt to uncover its determinants.
But there has been a confusion of objectives rsulting from a
failure to delimit the areas of concern. Previous investigations
by psychologists have also tended to underestimate the real, and
probably insuperable, complexity of factors involved in the
creative process. As Karl Popper (1976, p. 47) remarks, what
some psychologists have sought is a theory of successful creative
thinking. But, he adds, "I think that the demand for a theory of
successful thinking cannot be satisfied, and that it is not the
same as the demand for a theory of creative thinking."
The limit indicated here by Popper is a helpful one, and
will be observed in the present study. My concern will
accordingly be with the nature and dynamics of creative thought,
not with the conditions which determine its success. R. L.
Mooney (1963, p. 331) pointed to four separate lines of inquiry
that should be distinguished: (a) the product created, (b) the
process of creation, (c) the personality of the creator, and (d)
the types of environment in which creation seems to come about.
The present discussion will be confined mainly to the second.
Transformations
As Graham Wallas (1926) showed, a great deal of suggestive
information is to be found in the introspective comments of
eminent artists and scientists, speaking about what they have
observed of their own thought processes during creation.
Wallas's model, now little remembered, put the various elements
of the creative process into sequential order, a set of stages,
beginning with "preparation" and moving through "incubation" and
"illumination" to "verification." Some support for Wallas's view
was obtained experimentally by such workers as Patrick (1934) and
Eindhoven and Vinacke (1952). These studies, however, raise
several unsolved theoretical questions, and in this respect they
offer a useful starting point for the present discussion.
Patrick gathered a group of practising poets and asked them
to write a poem in a short time under laboratory conditions. The
stimulus given to the poets was a detailed picture of a
landscape. Each poet was observed by Patrick as he worked, and
the written evidence of his progress towards a finished poem was
studied for signs of Wallas's four stages of thought. Patrick
claimed to have found evidence of incubation--defined by Wallas
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as the elaboration of an idea in unconsciousness prior to its
realization in consciousness. This was provided by "those cases
in which the idea of the poem appeared earlier in the report,
after which the poet talked of various things, and then this
original idea appeared as the subject of the poem." She found
evidence of this kind in over two thirds of her subjects.
Patrick also questioned her subjects afterwards about their
experience of creative work generally, and many of the replies
indicated an awareness of incubation-like processes. A typical
comment of the poets was this reply:
A poem is a spiritual irritation. It annoys me until it
breaks out. I sometimes incubate a mood for years. I do
not incubate the lines. The idea lies fallow and comes back
when conditions are favourable. (p. 30)
Some speak in this way of the recurrence of a mood; others talk
of carrying around a word or a line.
Patrick's experiment is suggestive, although her demand that
the poets talk aloud as they work may have disrupted normal
creative thought more than she acknowledged. In the experiment
all thought took place in the light of the known demand that a
poem be produced. Outside the experiment, however, the first
sign reported by the poet was an awareness of a mood or line
already signalling a potential poem: the thought was the issue
of some incubatory period which must be supposed to have run its
course earlier. This mood or line may then go underground again
in a further period of incubation. It was awareness of this
process that the poets were able to report. The verbal reports
of the experiment were able to show only that incubation of ideas
had taken place; the appearance and development of moods, which
did not appear in the protocols, may be of greater significance.
These are uncapturable by such a method (and probably thwarted in
some cases).
As this study indicates, the problem to be addressed is how
incubation itself is initiated and how it is kept in process--
that is, how the mood or idea once formed continues to develop
productively. Such development was shown in an experiment
carried out with painters by Eindhoven and Vinacke. A poem was
given to a number of artists and non-artists, who were asked to
produce an illustration in response. Several weeks were allowed,
and the subjects were able to work at home when they chose. All
the evidence on paper of the various attempts towards a final
acceptable picture were collected. It was found that the artists
produced more sketches at first than the non-artists, and varied
the nature of the activity within the sketches more, and then
spent comparatively longer on the final version. But the most
interesting observation was that the sketches of the artists
showed a connection lacking in those of the non-artists, somewhat
along the lines found by Patrick:
when the sketch selected as publishable is compared with
preceding sketches, it appears that artists tend to combine
elements from preceding sketches--that is, the satisfactory
sketch is more similar to preceding sketches than these are
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to each other. The publishable sketch chosen by the non-
artist is no more similar or dissimilar to preceding
sketches than others in the series. (p. 160)
The artists' ideas tended to elaborate into a more inclusive,
organized whole, whereas the non-artist showed only variation
with no development.
The earlier sketches of the artists in this experiment were
a type of incubation that was both conscious and unconscious--
unconscious partly because the end of the process was not yet in
view, and because ideas that were present in the earlier sketches
disappeared from the conscious attention of the artist for a
while, then reappeared integrated into the final picture. What
integrating agency in thought is responsible for such
transformations has yet to be explained. Outside creativity
itself, plenty of evidence for the active transformation of
material in memory has accumulated since Bartlett's (1932)
classic studies demonstrated the phenomenon, but here the
processes involved tend to work towards the revision of material
in thought to accommodate it to previous understanding;
Bartlett's subjects, for example, altered details of the strange
stories with which they had been presented to accord with the
more rational standards of story structure they were used to. In
creative thought, by contrast, old material evolves towards
something distinctively new. How such transformations are
initiated, and what energies or motives may underlie the highly
productive elaborations that result, are the main questions to
which I now turn.
Anomalies
Wallas's notion of incubation is supported by the two
studies I have cited, although it is clear from the second that
it is a more flexible process than the strictly consecutive set
of stages envisaged by Wallas--incubation takes place on a number
of ideas at various times during the course of creative work.
What, in these studies, might count as preparation in Wallas's
terms is not discussed, but it is difficult to see how any direct
study could reasonably attempt to do so. Preparation is perhaps
the most ill-defined of Wallas's stages. What counts as
preparation would seem to range from the conscious detailed work
on a given problem, as in Poincar&'s (1946) famous account of his
own thought processes, to anything or everything in the creative
person's previous experience. If this is so, then it also
follows that it would be impossible in most instances of creative
thought to develop a conception of what may have taken place
during incubation. But if incubation does take place, some
special characteristic regarding the thought material of
preparation must be discoverable which will cause the involuntary
and unconscious transformations that follow, since it must be
assumed that by no means all preparatory thought issues in a
creative transformation--problems are abandoned unsolved, much
experience never finds its way into a novel or poem. What is the
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special agency that will generate a creative idea out of one set
of circumstances for an individual but not another? This, as
quickly becomes apparent, is the heart of the problem.
One general aspect of preparation that has often been
noticed is that the creative person has a wide range of
interests. The more the creative person knows in a wide variety
of fields the better. Rosamond Harding (1940) instances some
famous geniuses in history: James Watt, for example, known to us
as an innovative chemist and physicist, was also interested in
antiquities, medicine, etymology, music, law, metaphysics, and
German philosophy and poetry. R. K. White's (1931) study of the
biographies of three hundred eminent men of the last five hundred
years showed the versality of Watt to have been typical of most
of the group. The advantages of such scope were indicated by
Barlett (1958), in speaking about experimental scientists:
Far the most important aspects of the experimenter's need to
master method and to handle apparatus is that in the
majority of cases . . . the method and the instrumentation
are brought into his field of work from the outside. There
is something about experimenting, sometimes even in its
routine forms, which demands a variety of interests.
(p. 133)
Here, a model procedure developed in one field is important for
use in another. More generally, a concept developed in one field
may be applied to understanding another. Clearly the more
versatile the scientist the wider the range of concepts at his
disposal. As Poincar& observed, the most productive ideas in
mathematics
are those which reveal to us unsuspected kinship between
other facts, long known, but wrongly supposed to be
strangers to one another.
Among chosen combinations the most fertile will often
be those formed of elements drawn from domains which are far
apart. (p. 386)
This view of creative thought is familiar from the writing of
Arthur Koestler (1964) who coined the useful term "bisociation"
to describe it.
Metaphor, it will be noticed, is often explained in similar
terms: the most interesting metaphors are those where the
contributing concepts draw on the most dissimilar domains
(Tourangeau, 1982). But it has yet to be explained how the
transfer of ideas across domains comes to be understood in
metaphor; specifically, it is not clear how the concepts in one
domain help to structure the view in the other. In what sense
can ideas be said to cross from one domain to another--if it
makes sense at all? Similarly, the crossing of ideas between
domains in creative thought, while it appears to take place as a
regular feature of such thought, is, as a process, very poorly
understood. Why and how it happens raises essentially the same
difficulty for cognitive psychology as the phenomenon of
metaphor. As I shall mention below, a solution to the one
problem would seem to imply a solution to the other.
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Besides the wide knowledge spanning several domains that
often seems a condition of preparation, another factor that has
been described is that of curiosity or wonder. Einstein's (1949)
account of this faculty in the scientist suggests one way that
domains might interact:
For me it is not dubious that our thinking goes on for the
most part without use of signs (words) and beyond that to a
considerable degree unconsciously. For how, otherwise,
should it happen that sometimes we "wonder" quite
spontaneously about some experience? This "wondering" seems
to occur when an experience comes into conflict with a world
of concepts which is already sufficiently fixed in us.
Whenever such a conflict is experienced hard and intensively
it reacts back upon our thought world in a decisive way.
The development of this thought world is in a certain sense
a continuous flight from "wonder." (p. 9)
Einstein's comment shows the necessity of setting aside or going
beyond established concepts.
It also locates the origin of new thought in a conflict
between experience and existing knowledge. Einstein gave a
graphic account of one such moment in his experience as a young
man, when he saw the contradictions between Planck's new law of
radiation by discrete "quanta" of energy and the formulations of
classical mechanics. At the time, he said,
All my attempts . . to adapt the theoretical
foundations of physics to this new type of knowledge failed
completely. It was as if the ground had been pulled out
from under one with no firm foundation to be seen anywhere,
upon which one could have built. (p. 45)
Under these circumstances, there may take place, in the
scientific field concerned, what Kuhn (1970) called a paradigm
switch: that is, a new set of symbolic formulations, theories,
and exemplary experimental solutions replaces the existing set.
This itself constitutes creative thought of the highest order.
Such a total reorganisation does not arise gradually or logically
out of a process of interpreting the data afresh. The new
paradigm, or a glimpse of it, instead emerges all at once--as
Kuhn adds, "sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of
a man deeply immersed in crisis" (p. 90).
This type of event is in marked contrast to how normal
science is described; in Kuhn's account, this is concerned with
the development and testing of existing theory, involving the
elimination of anomalies between what theory predicts and what is
observed. Only when the number of anomalies grows too great,
calling into question the explanatory power of current theory (as
"quanta" did in regard to classical mechanics for Einstein) is
such a paradigm switch likely to occur. The key to a new theory
often seems to come from the consideration of a concept from a
different field. The blocking of the normal categorizing
functions of thought brought about by insuperable anomalies may
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initiate a search for some way out of the impasse, widening the
field of relevant considerations.
Several scientists have commented on the aesthetic character
of a new theory as if this were a hallmark of its distinctive
quality. Einstein, for example, praised the achievement of Bohr,
in developing his electron theory amidst the crisis of physics
mentioned above, as "the highest form of musicality in the sphere
of thought" (pp. 46-47). The sense of harmony given by a new
theory, Poincare remarked,
is at once a satisfaction of our aesthetic needs and an aid
to the mind, sustaining and guiding. And at the same time,
in putting under our eyes a well-ordered whole, it makes us
foresee a mathematical law . . The useful combinations are
precisely the most beautiful . . . (pp. 391-392)
An essential aspect of the aesthetic sense, it would seem, is its
power to guide, to confer a degree of foresight upon thought.
Through its aesthetic aspects, the theory is felt to possess the
power to order experience beyond the form in which it is first
given. The aesthetic sense may also be supposed to operate
during normal science, when prevailing theory is being
consolidated and tested; but in this case it acts to keep out of
play ideas in conflict with existing theory. Aesthetic foresight
under normal circumstances registers the expected resolution of
anomalies, not their potential as departure points for some
emerging new view. The creative scientist is the one whose
aesthetic sense enables him to detect those contradictions in the
field that might lead towards a better theory.
The notion of preparation can now be elaborated into three
interdependent elements, which together begin to endow it with
some explanatory value. Apart from (a) the existing conceptual
framework in a given field, there must be (b) encounters with
sufficient anomalies to call the existing framework into
question, and (c) a search outside the existing framework for
concepts not hitherto connected with the field. Einstein's
"musicality" suggests something of the character of the search,
and Poincare's "aesthetic" entity conveys a sense of the object at
the end of the search. The illumination, when it occurs,
specifically resolves all three contributing aspects of the
preparation stage into one whole: it reinterprets existing
knowledge and shows a relationship to other areas hitherto
regarded as separate, and in so doing anomalies disappear--become
one with the substance of the new theory. Since all of the
existing conceptual framework enters reinterpreted into the new
theory, the theory clearly has more applications than can be
verified immediately; its potential extension to all that has
been thought before must be supposed to surround the illumination
with an extensive penumbra of thoughts. Thus the "aesthetic" in
scientific thought does not signify something attained, static or
finished; it is the attained together with the potential for
extension into further areas of thought and meaning. A more
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inclusive whole, of which the thinker has some intuition, remains
beyond that which has so far been realized.
Few of us are creative scientists. Yet certain intuitive
and transformational properties appear to be inherent in thought,
despite the tendency noted by Bartlett to accommodate new
perceptions to existing concepts. Something of the meaning of
these properties can be learned from the evidence of dreams. The
same nexus of phenomena can be found as agents of creative
thought here as those just discussed--the carrying forward of
past experience, the need to resolve anomalies, and bisociation
between distant fields, if with less striking and immediate
results. As in the preparation stage of creativity, the role and
meaning of past experience in dreams (of such significance in
scientific thought) is at once crucial and extremely
problematical. But examination of dream instances helps to
suggest the nature of the relationship.
Without specialist aid, the normal memory for dreams is
capricious and of limited help in understanding the role of
dreams in the individual's thought. But the awakening of the
dreamer under controlled conditions in the laboratory has
provided more productive evidence whereby the relationship
between thoughts and their development through successive dreams
can be studied. An example reported by Rechtschaffen, Vogel, and
Shaikun (1963) offers a striking illustration. The dreamer was
an undergraduate who had just finished taking her final
examinations. The dreams are clearly related in several ways to
the implications of her recent experience. In the first the
dreamer is in a boat with friends, and afraid of overturning; in
the second she has just taken an examination and is walking
outside on a sunny day; in the third she is involved in an odd
game maneuvering cars in a parking lot, in which her lab
instructor is scoring her performance; in the fourth she is back
in a boat (now a racing boat) and deciding it would be better if
the boat sank; finally she is observing a scene in a hospital
where one patient is about to be substituted for another, as the
first is about to die--because "He was an important person, and
they couldn't let people know about it" (p. 545).
If, as Foulkes (1966, p. 97) has suggested, the dreams in
such a series all treat the same problem, clearly the problem is
not treated the same way in each dream. For example, the dreamer
is afraid of the boat overturning in the first dream, but by the
end of the night she seems to have decided that it would be
better if her boat was sunk. The problem that the dreams treat
appears to be not so much the examinations themselves as the
personal consequences for the dreamer of their results. The
dreams show her admitting a fear (what would happen if the boat
overturned?), and then to some extent coming to terms with it.
That the boat is now a racing boat suggests another assessment of
the meaning of the activity at college. But the final dream, set
in the hospital, could probably be read as showing considerable
residual anxiety over how she would view herself in the light of
failure. Her uncertainty is such that the problem of her self-
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image is split off and rendered symbolically: she becomes a
detached observer contemplating the "death" of the person she
believed herself to be and the substitution of another
personality. She makes a trial, in other words, of seeing
herself as a different person without the risk of the attendant
feelings involved in sacrificing her present self-image as
somebody "important."
In this way the dream thought exhibits a degree of
development in its grasp of the problem as the night proceeds;
succeeding dreams reach a more profound understanding of the
issues than earlier ones. The spontaneous creativity of the
thought in these dreams is striking. The pattern of thought that
emerges is one in which thought about immediate or recent events
translates into the dream and serves to evoke the expression in a
more symbolic form of the thinker's underlying preoccupations.
In this respect memory appears in an active role, developing
itself productively independently of the conscious control or
intentions of the thinker. But if memories are being transformed
in dreams, what exactly is it that is being developed? The third
dream set in the parking lot provides the most transparent clue.
The lab instructor is a reproduction of memory, but his function
as a grade giver is derogated by the rather futile nature of the
activities he is scoring. This transformation and its symbolic
form embodies a judgment. What has developed most significantly,
if the third dream is compared with the first, is the attitude of
the dreamer towards her activity at college.
Judgments are also a part of memory, of course-the more
affective aspect of memory. As such they can serve in the active
process of recollection as much as the memory of a perception, as
the comment of one of Barlett's (1932) subjects showed. Of his
memory for some military faces on cards that had been shown
several weeks earlier, he observed:
I sometimes remembered the judgments I made before. It was
not the words I recalled, but simply the fact that I thought
so and so about the pictures . . . there seemed to be a
reinstatement of a particular "feeling." (p. 60)
What dreams appear to be registering above all are judgments--
attitudes towards events, situations, people, future
possibilities, and the relation of the dreamer towards these
things. The chief point of a dream appears to be the exploration
and development of such judgments. Memory elements, whether
present as originally laid down or themselves transformed are not
the judgments--they are invoked to express and clothe the
judgments. If the process of thought in dreams is an indication,
then the most fundamental level of thought, the ground of its
being, is not the flow of ideas or perceptions, but judgment. In
this way, judgment can be seen as the driving power of the dream,
with anomaly providing the direction.
Several of the common uses of the word judgment, but not
all, are in accord with this suggestion: judgment is the act of
placing a complex perception in relation to the goals and beliefs
of the self. Of those judgments made by the self, there are
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value judgments, certain types of aesthetic judgments, character
judgments: each represents a decision based on a reading of the
implications of the perception for the self. The dreamer arrives
at such a point of decision in relation to her college life in
the dream sequence I have discussed. The special act of judgment
I am proposing here necessarily involves the self's concept of
itself (which may in large part be unavailable to conscious
introspection); simple acts of judgment, such as deciding which
is the best washing machine to buy, or what colors will look well
together in decorating a room, are unlikely to require processing
at this fundamental level. The power of judgment, in this
special sense, determines the thought transformations seen in
dreams.
The causes of a particular dream sequence probably lie in
the experience of the preceding day, although Freud's (1958)
generalization that only the less important events of the day
(for consciousness, that is) are used as a focus for dream
formation no longer seems tenable. But some intersection of the
day's events with the dreamer's underlying pattern of thoughts
and judgments about himself would provide the principal
determinants. The events of the day do not leave this body of
judgments unaltered--thought, in Barlett's phrase, is a process
of schema and correction--and it seems likely that some anomaly
at the point of intersection will contribute to initiating the
dream of the subsequent night. The experience of the day, in
other words, is always likely to invoke some of the long-standing
and continually developing judgments that exist in the depth of
thought.
The relation of the dream to daily experience is thus a
twofold one: to the concerns of the previous day, whether these
have involved serious or mundane matters, and to the accumulated
and always developing pattern of subconscious judgments and
attitudes that comprises the deeper level of thought. This
provides another way of conceiving the preparation phase of
creativity, and it shows a similar pattern to the process of
scientific thinking that was discussed above. Where the overt
anomaly, or "wonder" mentioned by Einstein, initiates the domain
crossing in scientific thought, unconscious anomalies in the
dreamer's thought initiate the kind of domain crossing that is
shown in a dream's manifest imagery--such as the boat with which
the undergraduate represented her situation at college. The
common factor which makes the anomaly of the dreamer analogous to
that of the scientist, is the personal significance of the
problem situation which generates the anomaly. The creative
scientist, as Einstein's remarks show, has invested his own sense
of self in the intelligibility and development of the theories he
investigates. For such a scientist, the personal significance of
his acts of judgment would seem to constitute the driving power
of his creative thought.
A model of creative thought proposed by Ernst Kris (1952)
suggested that original thought was fuelled by affective
components of the self. He based it on Freud's theory of primary
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and secondary process thinking, in which the primary is seen as
the affect-laden type of thought shown by the infant, while the
secondary is the rational and analytic type of thought shown by
the adult. Kris proposed that the artist was distinguished by
his ability to regress to primary process thought voluntarily-
what Kris called "regression in the service of the ego" (p. 177).
Several investigators followed Kris's lead, and were able to
demonstrate that the artist showed a greater availability of such
thought than the non-artist (e.g., Myden, 1959). According to
this view the productive energy of the conceptual material at the
preparation stage is given to it by its arousal of long-standing
affects and memories. Primary process thought in the artist is
that moment at which the new perspective becomes available to the
consciousness of the creator. This model, although suggestive,
is lacking in a cause for that focussed impetus to cross domains
and transform thought that is to be found in dreams and
scientific thinking. But it provides another perspective on the
productive role that may be assigned to affect in creative
thought.
The relation of immediate to past experience has been a
feature of each of the types of thought so far examined. Each
has allowed additional aspects of the preparation phase of
creativity to be sketched in. It is now appropriate to question
more closely the nature of preparation and its relation to
illumination.
The Process of Creative Thought
Illumination characteristically gives a sense of context.
Whether faintly or vividly, there is a sense of some whole beyond
the immediately present idea; it is the former that marks out the
idea as arresting, making it distinguishable from the normal
contents of thought. The description of their creative thought
in aesthetic terms by scientists shows the grounds they share in
this respect with artists. What is the nature of the preparation
that has brought this about? Several forces appear to be at
work.
The formative impulse to creative thought appears to be an
experience that cannot be reduced to an existing category-in
scientific thought, an anomaly. Whether consciously or
unconsciously, sufficient anomalies in normal thought appear to
cause a search among more remote and hitherto unconsidered
concepts, hence setting into motion, as it were, a wider range of
concepts in relation to the anomalous experience. Val6ry (1957),
for instance, spoke of the mobility of the mind, its restlessness
and diversity, which for the writer is his incomparable resource.
The instability, incoherence, inconsequence . . .which
trouble and limit the mind in any sustained effort of
construction, are just as surely also treasures of
possibility, whose riches it senses in its vicinity at the
very moment when it is consulting itself. These are the
,mind's reserves, from which anything may come . ..
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And yet not anything at random (as in the trial and error model
of creativity, proposed by D. T. Campbell (1960)), but only that
which is being sought. Val&ry adds: "The mind can always feel
in the darkness around it the truth or the decision it is looking
for .. ." (pp. 100-101). In genuine creative thought, each idea
entertained appears to be related to an end result and helps to
elicit it. The preliminary efforts made, whether "right" or
"wrong," aid the thinker in clarifying what it is he seeks for;
each idea is predictive in a greater or lesser degree of the end
result. No trial and error procedure can explain such findings
as those of Eindhoven and Vinacke regarding artists. The non-
artists in their study, by contrast, showed just such trial and
error procedures. The non-artists had no guiding idea, and
simply produced a series of varying pictures, randomly generating
ideas in which the last sketch showed no advance on the first.
It is in his special ability to preconceive his solution in some
way that the power of a creative thinker lies. The artist or
scientist is, in a sense, eliciting something which is already
there; he has not formed it consciously, but the suddenness of
illumination, so often reported by creative thinkers, shows that
its formation precedes, or is aside from, conscious thought. The
resulting paradox was well expressed by Kierkegaard (1971), in
the course of his commentary on Mozart:
The poet wishes for his subject; but, as we say that wishing
is no art, it is quite rightly and truthfully said about
many impotent poetic wishes. To wish rightly, on the other
hand, is a great art, or, rather it is a gift. It is the
inexplicable and mysterious quality of genius that, like a
divining rod, it never gets the idea of wishing except when
the thing wished for is present. (p. 48)
To suppose that the affects of childhood-the energy of primary
process thinking--were the source of new aesthetic forms in the
adult, would clearly be inadequate. Yet the energy of such
thought, its fluid, autistic and syncretic nature, may underlie
the reorganization of conceptual categories that anomalies in
current experience enforce on secondary process thought--that
power of the creator's imagination that, in Coleridge's (1971)
words, "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate . . .
(p. 167). The analogous power of the underlying judgment in
dreams has already been suggested: the dream work reforms and
utilizes images from memory in order to express pictorially
otherwise inexpressible thoughts.
The nature of the memory for judgments allows us to suppose
that both the childhood forms of primary process thinking and the
complex of current attitudes are equally available and active.
In the unconscious, memories themselves are timeless, as Freud
pointed out: a specific memory only becomes time-marked when it
is consciously remembered. All affects and judgments, whether of
childhood or of adult origin, are therefore always present, and
the current complex of judgments would appear to involve their
continual exploration and reinterpretation. Daily conscious
experience influences the underlying complex of judgments but
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cannot determine either its form or its development; indeed,
conscious thought on a given topic may often be at odds with the
unconscious judgment that has been made: such conflicts seem not
infrequently to be the subject of dreams.
What the creator senses in his unconscious thought,
therefore, would appear to be the development of a judgment,
expressible through some unique and radical reformulation of his
existing repertoire of concepts. Anomalies in his experience
have activated developments in his underlying judgments which,
sooner or later, require that form of expression that involves a
fundamental transformation in his conceptual repertoire. If
judgment is the driving power in the preparation stage, then
prominence must be given to affect as the agent that reforms and
connects concepts. The possession of anomalies itself is not
enough to reorganize thought; the crossing of conceptual domains
to form a new whole in scientific or artistic thought requires a
directed search by some instrument that already "knows" what it
is looking for. What evidence might suggest that affect plays
this role?
Affective Foresight
Three lines of research can be mentioned: that on the
relation of affect and memory, work on the function of the
frontal regions of the brain, and the problem of understanding
response to metaphor.
Bartlett showed how affect could lead in the recovery of a
memory: one of his subjects, quoted above, talked of the
"reinstatement of a particular 'feeling'." The subjective
feelings that accompanied the original presentation of the
stimulus became, at recall, the cue to recovering the memory.
This was an incidental finding of Bartlett's work, and no attempt
was made at the time to investigate directly the relation of
affect to memory. The question has been taken up again recently,
however, by a number of workers. The issue raised by Bartlett's
finding is whether affective aspects of representation are
integral to the functioning of memory.
Spiro, Crismore and Turner (1982), for example, hypothesized
that two kinds of memory coding occur, discursive and
experiential (the experiential consisting of attitudes and
affects), and that the latter will be more important where
previous knowledge provides little basis for coding new
information. If memories are coded in some affective register--
what Spiro et al. termed "experiential coloration"--then
similarity of affect at the time of recall may aid the
reconstructive processes. An experiment to test this hypothesis
required subjects to learn material while under the effect of a
particular mood created by previous exposure to a poem. It was
found that later recall of the material was improved by
reinstatement of the mood, so that learning appeared to be
facilitated by association with a particular affect. A similar
effect was demonstrated with young children by Bartlett,
Burleson, and Santrock (1982), and by a number of other workers
interested in mood-state dependency effects in memory (e.g.,
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Bower & Cohen, 1982; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; a brief
review relating this research to metaphor is available in Miall
and Vondruska, 1983b).
These suggestive findings show affect directing memory
processes that have traditionally been considered semantic in
nature. If affect can initiate the links between concepts
required at recall, then it may also play a directing role in
more substantial, transformational thought processes. The
"experiential coloration," described by Spiro et al. as more
relevant in conditions where previous knowledge is inadequate,
might assume particular importance in the preparation stage of
creativity, where anomalies in experience have unsettled existing
knowledge. But here affect must be supposed to do more than
simply effect a bridge between a present and a previous concept
in memory. Affective "coloration" of experience in itself is a
necessary but not a sufficient explanation for the dynamics of
the creative thought transformations involved. Affect may also
have an anticipatory role to play, leading the conceptual
functions of the mind towards the domain which will be the origin
of the transformation.
A model of affect functioning in an anticipatory role can be
found in work on the frontal region of the brain. To be able to
conceive solutions to complex problems, it has been shown,
requires the intact functioning of this part of the brain, not
for its conceptual functions but for its connections to the
affective centers of the brain.
Tests on patients with frontal lesions have tended to show
that the chief deficit resulting is an inability to match action
as it is carried out with previously formed intentions. The
patients described by Milner (1964), for example, asked to sort
cards showing simple patterns according to changing criteria,
persevered in a course of action after it ceased to be
appropriate. On the stylus maze test patients were unable to
restrain themselves from rushing towards the goal, in defiance of
the rules of the test. Milner observed that in situations
requiring a constant shifting of response to meet changing
demands, the frontally-lesioned patient is unable to suppress his
immediate responses; what appears to have been lost is a
modulatory function normally exercised by the frontal region.
Nauta (1971) subsequently pointed to the anatomical evidence
for a close relationship between the frontal cortex and various
subcortical structures containing the affective centers (the
"fronto-limbic" relationship), which indicated that the frontal
region combines both sensory and effector functions. The frontal
lesion, he suggested, results in a perceptual and an affective
deficit. Behavioral anticipation requires the comparing in
thought of various alternatives; it is the comparison between the
affective responses they evoke which, Nauta suggested, keeps
normal strategic functioning on line. An analogy may be made
with sensory mechanisms, which are made ready for impending
action by a process of corollary discharge from motor mechanisms.
The frontal region may exercise a comparable function, presetting
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the mechanisms that deal with interoceptive information. Such a
presetting, in Nauta's words,
could be thought to establish a temporal sequence of
affective reference points serving as "navigational markers"
and providing, by their sequential order, at once the
general course and the temporal stability of complex goal-
directed behavior. (p. 183)
Lacking the cortical connections to set up such affective
markers, the frontally-lesioned patient suffers from an
impairment in his strategic decision making, and "a tendency of
projected or current action programs to "fade out" or become
over-ridden by interfering influences . . ." (p. 184).
Such an affective registry does not in itself explain
creative thought, but it suggests how the "coloration" of
concepts in memory has not only a connective, but more
significantly, an anticipatory role, given the appropriate
conditions. In the studies on frontal patients the problems are
set by the neurophysiologist. In creative thought, however, the
problems are the outcome of anomalies in experience: they are
set by the thought patterns of the creator himself, and his
affects preset the directions in which a solution may be found.
Since affects, according to Spiro et al., tend to link concepts
that have been stored with the same experiential coloration, the
concepts elicited by affect might come from domains far apart as
well as from within the same domain, so that new combinations
result.
During the preparation stage, therefore, under the influence
of anomalies in experience, the new judgment forming under the
impact of such anomalies--which comprises and reforms previous
judgments--sets in motion affects connected with the anomalous
experience; those affects effect a bridge between concepts
normally not considered to be connected, and in so doing act as
predictive markers offering directions in which to seek a
solution to the anomalies. Creative thought might thus be
conceived as being under the influence of a series of alternative
possibilities for what the expected solution will be, kept on
hand in a guiding set of affective reference points. The sense
of the solution, it will be recalled, is typically given at the
moment of illumination in affective form, suggesting that it is
in its predictive power, its felt connections to a range of other
concepts as yet beyond consciousness, that the productivity of
affect lies. Poincar&, for one, it will be recalled, spoke of
the anticipatory affective power of the moment of illumination
and its sense of harmony. If affect is the agent for crossing
conceptual domains and initiating transformations in thought at
the preparation stage, then it is to be expected that the moment
of illumination would be signalled in this way by a strong and
predictive affective charge.
Indirect evidence for the anticipatory role of affect in
thought is thus available from research on the brain. More
direct evidence may eventually be obtained from studies of the
response to metaphor. A first study by the author (Miall &
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Vondruska, 1983a) has provided evidence implicating affect in the
response to metaphor. In line with previous theoretical
arguments (Miall, 1977, 1979), it was hypothesized that, compared
with simile, metaphor involves a more radical transformation of
its topic under the influence of the vehicle. Responses were
obtained from children (3rd and 4th grades) and adults (college
freshmen) to a set of stories about different characters, each
containing either a metaphor or a simile. Evidence from the
children involved in this study supported the hypothesis, since
in the metaphor condition a higher proportion involved affective
ideas connected with the character. In this way metaphor was
seen as having a more powerful affective potential than simile, a
potential which might have predictive properties under
appropriate conditions. The results from the adults were more
difficult to understand, since the opposite picture was obtained:
more affective responses were made to the similes than to the
metaphors. But one explanation for this, which helps relate the
finding to the view of creative thought I have been presenting,
is that through affect, metaphor in adults taps the judgmental
level of response, and that this makes the ideas formed under the
impact of the metaphor less easy to express. In line with this
sugestion, it was also found that subjects in the metaphor
condition were less fluent than those in the simile condition,
generating fewer ideas in response to each story.
Affective conflict between vehicle and topic terms, in
addition to the domain difference, signals an anomaly to the
receiver of a metaphor. If the metaphor is a sufficiently
powerful or unusual one, it may also tap existing anomalies in
the individual's structure of judgments and play a formative role
in transforming some part of his thought world. It may be argued
that this is the primary function of literary metaphor, since it
can tap extensive regions of thought and draw them into new
combinations (Miall, 1979).
Our study offers evidence that affect is a significant
variable in response to metaphor. If this is correct, it may
indicate that affect plays a constructive role in the
comprehension process itself. In examining the response to
metaphor it has not been easy to understand how vehicle and topic
interact to transform the topic. Predominantly conceptual
approaches involving similarity, or domain-mapping have not so
far proved able to resolve all the problems associated with
comprehending novel metaphors. One alternative which has yet to
be considered is the affective cueing of salient concepts.
Affects of the same coloration may be attached to concepts
in widely divergent domains. Affects induced by a given metaphor
may therefore be the prime agents for linking the different
domains of vehicle and topic. Under the impact of metaphoric
dissonance, the inadequacy of concepts directly associated with
the topic causes a search among more distant concepts that
resonate with an affective coloration similar to the vehicle.
Through the affect attaching to it, the vehicle of the metaphor
initiates and guides this search, but does not determine its
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results. Those concepts that are affectively similar to the
vehicle are then applied to transforming the topic. As in the
various mood-state studies, such as that of Spiro et al., the
affect currently in consciousness provides the link to other
concepts which are "primed" by it, or activated at a subthreshold
level of excitement. In metaphor the vehicle is the affective
prime, since this is the "out of place" concept: the vehicle
draws attention to itself affectively.
If metaphor has this affective power, it may also "prime"
concepts beyond those immediately relevant to its own
interpretation. Thus, metaphor may make for greater textual
cohesiveness--an idea that has long been accepted by literary
theorists. Further experiments are now underway to test
empirically the hypothesis that the affective power of metaphors
has a predictive valence which would account for the developing
sense of cohesiveness in texts where they occur.
The value of such research on metaphor in the context of the
present discussion, lies in the fact that metaphor shows on a
small scale all the principle features of the thought processes
that are most significant in creative thought. If creative
thought is analyzable as the presence of productive anomalies,
the crossing of conceptual boundaries, the transformation of a
subject within a given domain, and the intuition of a new order
at the moment of illumination, as I have argued above, so is the
response to metaphor. To understand the thought processes
involved in interpreting metaphor--a goal which is still somewhat
remote--would be to travel a considerable distance towards an
understanding of the mysteries of creativity itself. The key to
both phenomena may be found in the predictive role of affects in
thought--a topic which has so far received almost no experimental
study.
The main lines of the present discussion have now been
presented, but there remain several issues which should be
briefly mentioned. The relation of affect to judgment forms one
issue which has not yet been sufficiently clarified. While
judgment, I have suggested, is at the basis of all thought, and
is in a continual process of revision and renewal, this in itself
contains only evolutionary, not transformational potential. It
is affect that works to bring about transformations at the
creative level, being more mobile than judgment and able to shift
the meaning and connections of ideas more readily; but affect
operates under the control of judgment in this respect. If this
is the case, then it might be expected that it would be possible
to discern the relation from the kind of introspective evidence
with which this paper began.
An interesting, if obscure, distinction of this kind does
appear to be made by several artists. Wordsworth (1965), for
example, speaks of the poet as possessing
an ability of conjuring up in himself passions, which are
indeed far from being the same as those produced by real
events, yet (especially in those parts of the general
sympathy which are pleasing and delightful) do more nearly
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resemble the passions produced by real events, than anything
which, from the moments of their own minds merely, other men
are accustomed to feel in themselves . . . (p. 453)
This distinction between two sorts of "passions," one of which is
a special resource of the poet, might suggest that Wordsworth is
speaking of judgments and affects, respectively. The chief
ability of the poet, therefore, lies in his ability to arouse a
sense of judgment through his poetry. Another poet who mentions
a type of feeling in poetry below ordinary feelings is Coleridge
(1962). In a notebook entry (No. 2086) he remarks that:
Poetry (is) a rationalized dream dealing . . . to manifold
Forms our own Feelings, that never perhaps were attached by
us consciously to our own personal Selves . . 0 there are
Truths below the Surface in the subject of Sympathy, & how
we become that which we understandly behold & hear, having,
how much God perhaps only knows, created part even of the
Form.
A similar distinction can be found in T. S. Eliot's (1963, p. 10)
cautious insistence that "The business of the poet is not to find
new emotions, but to use the ordinary ones and, in working them
up into poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual
emotions at all."
The consideration of creative thought also carries
implications for the nature of conceptual representation.
Concepts cannot be bounded or unitary elements, since it is the
open-ended, connotational connections of concepts at illumination
that link consciousness to the as yet unseen new whole in
unconsciousness. Metaphor at its best, as I have argued
elsewhere (Miall, 1979), also requires the support of such
unconscious complexes of thought and judgment for its initial
interpretation, and these are dependent on the transformation of
the topic by the work of the vehicle in priming, or making
salient, new concepts. It makes more sense to see such thought
in terms of a "schema-of-the-moment" (Iran-Nejad & Ortony, 1982),
drawing on the connotational resources of a variety of concepts,
than as a series of activated links between concepts mapped in
semantic space. This connotational connectedness of creative
thought is well captured in a letter of the poet John Keats
(1958), where he observes that
every point of thought is the center of an intellectual
world--the two uppermost thoughts in a Man's mind are the
two poles of his World he revolves on them [sic] and
everything is southward or northward to him through their
means . . . (Vol. 1, p. 277)
"Everything" is no exaggeration here, if it is a transformation
in the pattern of judgments involving the whole personality that
is characteristic of creative thought.
This, finally, is the key implication of the view of
creativity presented here. Creative thought is a continual
process within the creative person, not confined to the periods
during which actual creative work is taking place. It involves
the creator in a continual effort to understand and, in a sense,
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to make himself. Creative thought not only expresses the
repertoire of judgments, it helps to clarify and redirect it; it
reacts back on the creator in incalculable ways. As Jung (1966,
p. 103) has said, "The work in process becomes the poet's fate
and determines his psychic development. It is not Goethe who
creates Faust, but Faust which creates Goethe."
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